CIHM 

ICIVIH 

Microfiche 

Collection  de 

Series 

microfiches 

(Monographs) 

(rnonographies) 

Canadian  Institute  for  Historical  Microreproductlons  /  Institut  Canadian  de  microreproductions  historiques 


.MM 


Technical  and  Bibliographic  Notes  /  Notes  techniques  et  bibliographiques 


The  Institute  has  attempted  to  obtain  the  best  original 
copy  available  for  filming.  Features  of  this  copy  which 
may  be  bibliographically  unique,  which  may  alter  any  of 
the  images  in  the  reproduction,  or  which  may 
significantly  change  the  usual  method  of  filming  are 
checked  below. 


0 


Coloured  covers  / 
Couverture  de  couleur 


□   Covers  damaged  / 
Couverture  endommag^e 

□   Covers  restored  and/or  laminated  / 
Couverture  restaur^e  et/ou  pellicul^e 

I I   Cover  title  missing  /  Le  titre  de  couverture  manque 

I I   Coloured  maps  /  Cartes  g6ographiques  en  couleur 

□   Coloured  ink  (i.e.  other  than  blue  or  black)  / 
Encre  de  couleur  (i.e.  autre  que  bleue  ou  noire) 

□   Coloured  plates  and/or  illustrations  / 
Planches  et/ou  illustrations  en  couleur 

Bound  with  other  materia!  / 
Reli6  avec  d'autres  documents 

Only  edition  available  / 
Seule  Edition  disponible 

Tight  binding  may  cause  shadows  or  distortion  along 
interior  margin  /  La  reliure  serr6e  peut  causer  de 
I'ombre  ou  de  la  distorsion  le  long  de  la  marge 
int^rieure. 

Blank  leaves  added  during  restorations  may  appear 
within  the  text.  Whenever  possible,  these  have  been 
omitted  from  filming  /  Use  peut  que  certaines  pages 
blanches  ajout6es  lors  d'une  restauration 
apparaissent  dans  le  texte,  mais,  lorsque  cela  6tait 
possible,  ces  pages  n'ont  pas  6t6  film6es. 

Additional  comments  / 
Commentaires  suppi6mentaires: 


n 


D 


L'Institut  a  microfilm^  le  meilleur  exemplaire  qu'il  lui  a 
6t6  possible  de  se  procurer.  Les  details  de  cet  exem- 
plaire qui  sont  peut-§tre  uniques  du  point  de  vue  bibli- 
ographique,  qui  peuvent  modifier  une  image  reproduite, 
ou  qui  peuvent  exiger  une  modification  dans  la  m6tho- 
de  normale  de  filmage  sont  indiqu6s  ci-dessous. 

I I   Coloured  pages  /  Pages  de  couleur 

I I   Pages  damaged  /  Pages  endommag6es 


D 


Pages  restored  and/or  laminated  / 
Pages  restaur^es  et/ou  pellicul^es 


0   Pages  discoloured,  stained  or  foxed  / 
Pages  d6color6es,  tachet6es  ou  piqu6es 

I      I   Pages  detached  /  Pages  d6tach6es 

|n/]   Showthrough  /  Transparence 

I      I   Quality  of  print  varies  / 


D 
D 


D 


Quality  in^gale  de  I'impression 

Includes  supplementary  material  / 
Comprend  du  materiel  supplementaire 

Pages  wholly  or  partially  obscured  by  errata  slips, 
tissues,  etc.,  have  been  refilmed  to  ensure  the  best 
possible  image  /  Les  pages  totalement  ou 
partiellement  obscurcies  par  un  feuillet  d'errata,  une 
pelure,  etc.,  ont  6t6  film6es  k  nouveau  de  fa?on  k 
obtenir  la  meilleure  image  possible. 

Opposing  pages  with  varying  colouration  or 
discolourations  are  filmed  twice  to  ensure  the  best 
possible  image  /  Les  pages  s'opposant  ayant  des 
colorations  variables  ou  des  decolorations  sont 
film6es  deux  fois  afin  d'obtenir  la  meilleure  image 
possible. 


D 


This  Kern  is  filmed  at  the  reduction  ratio  checked  below  / 

Ce  document  est  film*  au  taux  d«  rWuetlon  indlqu*  ci-dessous. 


lOx 

14x 

18x 

22x 

26x 

30x 

J 

12x 

16x 

20x 

24x 

?Ry 

39v 

Th«  copy  fiimad  h«r«  hu  b««n  reproduced  thanks 
to  tho  ganorosity  of: 

National  Library  of  Canada 


L'axamplairt  filmi  fut  raproduit  grica  A  la 
g4n4rosit*  da: 

Bibliotheque  nationals  du  Canada 


Tha  imagas  appearing  hara  ara  tha  bast  quality 
possibia  considaring  tha  condition  and  lagibility 
of  tha  original  copy  and  in  kaaping  with  tha 
filnting  contract  spacificationa. 


Original  copias  in  printad  papor  covars  ara  filmad 
beginning  with  tha  front  cover  and  ending  on 
the  last  page  with  a  printed  or  illustrated  imprea- 
sion.  or  tha  back  cover  when  appropriate.  All 
other  original  copies  are  filmed  beginning  on  the 
first  page  with  a  printed  or  illustrated  imprea- 
sion.  and  ending  on  the  lest  page  with  a  printed 
or  illustreted  impression. 


Les  imagas  suivantas  ont  *ti  reproduites  avac  la 
plus  grand  soin,  compta  tenu  de  la  condition  at 
da  la  nettet*  de  I'exemplaira  filmi.  et  en 
conformity  avac  las  conditions  du  contrat  da 
filmaga. 

Les  exemplairaa  originaux  dont  la  couvarture  an 
papier  est  imprimie  sont  filmis  en  commengant 
par  la  premier  plat  at  an  terminant  soit  par  la 
darniAre  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration,  soit  par  la  second 
plat,  salon  la  cas.  Tous  les  autres  exemplairas 
originaux  sont  filmis  an  commencant  par  la 
premiere  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration  at  en  terminant  par 
la  derniire  page  qui  comporte  une  telle 
empreinte. 


The  last  recorded  frame  on  each  microfiche 
shall  contain  tha  symbol  — ^  (meaning  "CON- 
TINUED"), or  the  symbol  V  (meaning  "END"). 
whichever  applies. 

Maps,  plates,  charts,  etc..  may  be  filmed  at 
different  reduction  ratios.  Those  too  large  to  be 
entirely  included  in  one  exposure  are  filmed 
beginning  in  the  upper  left  hand  corner,  left  to 
right  and  top  to  bottom,  as  many  frames  as 
required.  The  following  diagrams  illustrate  the 
method: 


Un  doa  symbolaa  suivants  apparaitra  sur  la 
darniire  image  da  cheque  microfiche,  s«lon  le 
cas:  le  symbols  — ^signifie  "A  SUIVRE".  le 
symbols  V  signifie  "FIN". 

Les  cartas,  planches,  tableaux,  etc.,  peuvent  atra 
filmis  k  das  taux  da  reduction  diffirents. 
Lorsque  le  documen*  est  trop  grand  pour  atre 
raproduit  an  un  seul « !ich*,  il  est  film*  A  partir 
de  Tangle  supArieur  gauche,  de  gauche  A  droits. 
et  de  haut  an  bas.  an  prenant  la  nombre 
d'imeges  nicessaire.  Les  diagrammes  suivants 
illustrant  la  m^thoda. 


1  2  3 


1  2  3 

4  5  6 


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MICTOCOPY   RISOIUTION    TEST   CHART 

(ANSI  ond  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  2) 


^    APPLIED  I^A^GE 


1653   Eost    Mojn    Slfeet 
Rochester.    Ne*    York 
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(^16)   288-  5989  -Tax 


Rochester.    Ne*    York  URC^        h<;a 

^''6)   482  ^  03G0  -  Phone  ^ 


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THE 

RUSH-BAGOT 
AGREEMENT 


AN  ADDRESS  DELIVERED  BY 


The  Rt.  Hon.  Sir  CHARLES  FITZPATRICK 

CHIEF  JUSTICE  OF  CANADA 


AT  THE  LAWYERS'  CLUB  IN  THE 
CITY  OF  NEW  YORK 


MARCH  17.  1917 


THE 

RUSH-BAGOT 
AGREEMENT 

AN  ADDRESS  DELIVERED  BY 


The  Rt.  Hon.  Sir  CHARLES  FITZPa  -RICK 

CHIEF  JUSTICE  OF  CANADA 


AT  THE  LAWYERS'  CLUB  IN  THE 
CITY  OF  NEW  YORK 


18349—1 


MARCH  17.  1917 


AN  ADDRESS 

DCIUKKKI)   UV 

SIR  CHARLES  FITZF'ATRICK 

Before  llw  Laiivers'  Cltih.   .\n,    York  Cit\\ 
Mardi  17,   1017. 


I  want  to  thank  >.,ii,  Mr.  Cliainnan,  I..,-  vour  vi-is  .ncn.iis 
rHiTt-nci-s  t..  myself.  1  ,|,.  n,.t.  of  .o„rM..  prftr,.,!  to  .Umtn.. 
tlKMU.  but  I  approciatc  the  >•  irit  whi.  h  inoxv,!  voti  to  >|„..,k 
of  iiif  as  yni  havf  do-u-. 

I  fell  much  honourt-d.  (;fnlltnu'M,  l.v    thr    invitation    to 

appear  l)efore  you  on  this  occasion,  hut,  as  Mr.  Spencer  has  just 

told  you,  it  was  not  without  inisgivinR  that    I  accepted  it        i 

felt  then,  and  now  that   I  lune  attempted  the  task,  I  feel  to   i 

miK-h  larger  .legree.  the  truth  of  the  sa>  iug  of  the  writer  in  the 

Hook  of  hcde.Masticus.  •'tjiai  the  wisdom  of  the  scribe  eometii 

«.l    the   oi,,M,rtimity   of  lei.-,ure."     It  is  one  of  the  manv  ,lraw- 

back^  of  a  fairly  bu.sN  professicmal  and  jx-iitical  life.  that,  however 

Kreaf  on.   s  interest  may  be  in  subjects  conceminK  the  histor, 

<•♦  '«nc-  s  .     n  country,  even  if  allied  to  the  work  of  one's  j.rofe.-^- 

'Mun.  .r        ijutt,  xer  strong  one's  vi(>ws.   the   time  necessar>    to 

man.fesi     isefullv    the  one.   or   to   giNv  practical   effect    to'  the 

olhei    i,  .*=most  invarial)ly  wanting. 

Th        =t,i,.ct  ;    .ii,,.,<l   to  nie  is  full   of  interest,   and   it   is 

|!'""'  .me  dun  the  whole  British  Kmi'     is  staking  its 

''^^'  ^"^  '•  i»   TfalN.  we  '.hould  .issemble  here  to-dav  to 

fominei,  .u  Agreement    which  h.is  -.ot    l^.^n  broken,  'but 

18349— L* 


has  Imi'ii  failhfnlU  k(  j)!  for  .1  Inmdttil  \i.ir-  Wht  11  jolm 
yuiiH  y  A<lani>  in  Nuviinlirr,  ISI.S,  011  lull  ill"  i>|  tlu-  (ioMninunt 
at  W.i^hinnK'ii.  '  "^l  ai>i)ri>iiih.il  I.oril  (a^lk-rtauli  \villi  .1 
pn>iM)'Hil  for  nuilual  (lisinnaiiu  lit  on  i lie  (In at  Lakts,  lu-  \v.i-< 
ha])])!,  ill  hi^  oi)i)orttiiiity.  Tlic  iiU'»am  ,  wliich,  as  the  I  nittd 
Stati's  Miiii^tir  in  l,oii<i«iii,  Adam-  li.iil  to  iirli\rr  to  ilu-  Urili-li 
(iovi-mmtiit.  was  drafti  Ity  Jaiiu  -.  Moiiroi',  tliiii  Scirrtary  of 
State.  The  driMt  War  \vhi(  h  linl  lUvasialid  tlir  world  for 
more  than  twenty  years  wa-  o\ir,  W.itirloo  had  luen  foii^;ht 
aiul  won,  and  N.!'  Uon,  iioi  satisliid  with  Kll)a,  h.id  ne  to 
St.  Helena.  Tlu  ]Kf)i)K>  ol  l"-nrope  were  lilindly  (<■  ':  lluir 
way,    and    ►^ropinn   out    towardr^   sonu'    happier    >\st  »\hi(h 

would  rid  the  world  of  war  for  ever,  .\lready  sMtesnien  wen- 
huildi  eloud-eastles  in  the  air,  and  drcunin^;  ol  the  rei^;n  of 
univers..!  jn-aee,  entireU  ohlivious  of  thi'  fact  that,  as  Jo-eph  de 
Maistre  said,  "deiuiis  le  jotir  ou  Cain  tiia  Abel  il  y  a  toujours 
"eu  ea  et  la  siir  la  surface  du  ^lohe  les  mares  de  sanj;,  ([ue  n'ont 
"pu  desseihcr,  ni  les  vents  avee  leurs  hrulantes  halehies,  ni  le 
"soleil  avee.  tons  ses  feux."  \'isionar>  si  hemes  were  the  suhject 
of  eager  diset.ssion,  and  found  a  re.idy  welcome,  and  some  of 
the  hest  minds  of  Europe  were  being  dazzled  by  the  dream 
which  afterw  irds  took  form  as  the  Holy  .Alliance, — thai  strange 
system  by  which  the  banded  kings  were  pledged  to  regard  each 
other  as  brothers,  and  their  peo'  •  as  their  children,  and  to 
ensue    the    (io-iin-l    of    Christ.      '1  Alliance    has   been    well 

described  as  a  "])iece  of  sublinu  m\sticism  and  ncmsense." 
The  (ireat  Powers  who  were  i)ariies  to  it  ditl  not  realize  that 
wc  live  "in  a  world  of  thix  and  changi."  and  that  with  ]x?()plcs 
as  with  individuals  "growth  and  develoiiment  are  among  the 
conditions  of  life."  The  politii.d  situation  in  Kurojje  proves 
the  futility  of  "an  attempt  to  tit  growing  organisms  into  iron 
cases." 

Then    suddenly    came    the    short    ]>ractical    message    from 
across  the  Atlantic.     It  offered  no  revolution  in  the    world's 


.iftiiir-.  anil  lul.!  .  wl  r...  -iK.i.i!  |.i..iiii-,'  ..i  j..  rin.uini.  \  ;  hm 
its  w<Mk   .-iirlurc-s  to-.l.r.,       Iiil,  }\.,h    \!!i.  iH.    i\  (|,.„i  .nut 

its  \rn  iairiM)^'  f<,ryotiiii.  The  rci-mi  •  n,.  .hM.i  -.  ,  j  ;.,t 
f.ir  ic  Mtk.  Tu  ximc,  iif.iti.',  .mcl  <oii\. minus  ,,rc  m.-rv  i.ilk 
'.vit;i  xvliiih  M-iitiiiuiii.il  jiliil.i  ihropi-is  .mm-,.'  tin  iii-<  l\,  s, 
s^raJ)^  of  paiKr.  to  I..-  <  (.!i-i-ii.<l  toilu  w.iMr  pniur  iM-k.  i  uIk  ii 
thfv  >laiul  ill  thru.iv  '-•  llif.mil.iii<.ii.(l.vi^„,,,t  ,iii,„.n,i...,n(| 
kiiik>,  nliilsi  ,,,  oiluis,  .I'^rf.  niriMs  m.-.m  tlif  i.liKliiid  \v<.nl 
.111(1  Iiavi-  tluir  -.iiHiioii  ii,  il,c  DiNi,,.'  pnrfpi  wlii,  h  .tiioiiis 
that  I'Mii  miiM,  in  piil.lir  as  in  ],iivatf  lil,  .  "kw],  v.„r,.l  hi, 
fovn  .iiil." 


I<l    (.1    lia\ii\.    ( Iran" 


.uu 


Monrof's    Idler    \va-    a    iiuxli 
simi)li(ii\-,  and  r.iii  .i-,  folic, w> 

"Ilii-  iiifomiatioii  yon  ^\\v,  ,,\  onliT^  liaxiii^  l<«tn 
^issued  I)y  tlic  Hritisli  ( '.oNcrniiuiii.  to  incrtasc  its  nav.il 
"tore-  on  the  l,ala>,  is  conliniu'd  \,\  iiiuiiim-ni  c  from  that 
"qua,  ter.  of  nu-asuri>s  h.uiiiK  },vv,\  actiiallv  a<lo,)tf(l  for 
If  piirposf.  It  is  fvidcnt  if  f.uli  p.irtv  aiiKnunts  its 
rvv  tlure,  with  a  viiw  to  olnain  thi-  a's(fiidi-n(\-  owr 
"11..  othiT  that  vast  rxpciist-  will  Im-  incurred  and  the 
jianger  ol  (dlli>ioii  will  he  auKinented  in  like  decree.  'I'he 
"  I're.sident  is  sincerely  desirous  i,i  pie\ent  an  evil  which, 
'■a  IS  |)resiiined,  is  ef|iiaily  to  it- deprecated  l»v  both  Coverii- 

^inents.  He  therefore  authorizes  you  to  projioM-  lo  th«' 
"(iritish  (ioxcrninent  such  an  .irr.inKenieiit  rtsiK'CtiPK  the 
■'naval  force  lo  be  ke[)t  on  the  L.ikes  by  both  Covt  rnnients, 

"as  will  denionstiate  their  pacific  policy  and  secure  their 
"peace.  He  is  w illinj;  to  confine  it  on  each  side  to  a  certain 
•  noderate  lunnber  of  armed  vessels,  and  the  smaller  the 
'■number  the  more  ajireeable  to  him;  or  to  abstain  alto-' 
"aether  from  .-m  armed  force  be\(,nd  that  used  for  the 
"revenue.  Von  wiH  brinj;  this  subject  under  the  ( on- 
'sidcration  of  the  British  Government  immediateU  after 
"the  recei{)t  ot  this  letter." 

Lord  Castlereagh  was  surprised  .ind  ptri>li\ed.  .md  natur- 
ally inclined  at  first  to  be  a  little  .sus])i(  ious.  Such  an  enj^aye- 
18349— 2  J 


6 


ment  would  tie  the  hands  of  both  Jiartics  until  war  should  have 
commenced,  and  the  Americans,  by  their  proximit\-,  would  be 
able  to  i>re[)are  armaments  for  attack,  much  sooner  than  those 
of  the  British  could  be  prei)arcd  for  defence.  ()n  January  .M, 
1816,  Adams  writing  to  Monroe  says:  "I  think  the  ]>roi)osal 
will  not  be  accepted."  But  the  jiroposal  was  renewed  in  a  note 
of  which  the  following  extract  is  far-sighted: — 

"The  increase  of  naval  armaments  on  one  side  upon 
"the  lakes  during  jwace,  will  necessitate  the  like  increase 
"on  the  other,  and  besides  causing  an  aggravation  of  use- 
"less  expense  to  both  parties,  must  operate  as  a  continual 
"stinnilus  of  sus|)icion  and  of  ill-will  upon  the  inhabitants 
"and  local  authorities  of  the  borders  against  those  of  their 
"neighbours.  The  moral  and  political  tendency  of  such 
"a  system  must  be  to  war  and  not  to  ix.>ace." 

Words  ])regnant  with  wisdom  and  i)olitical  foresight. 

One  would  imagine  that  when  he  wrote  that  letter  Mr. 
Monroe  had  present  to  his  mind  this  i)hrase  from  Bacon 
(Essay  of  Empire):  "Let  men  beware  how  they  neglect  and 
suffer  matter  of  trouble  to  be  ])rei)ared;  for  no  man  can  forbid 
the  sivark  nor  tell  whence  it  ma>-  come." 

Certainly  if  ("astlereagh  hail  been  inclined  to  take  a  narrow 
view  of  the  situation,  there  was  abundant  ground  for  hesitation. 
At  that  ^cry  time  (ircat  Britain  was  making  a  determined 
effort  to  secure  a  superiority  of  naval  force  on  the  Lakes.  At 
Kingston  a  shii)-of-the-line  built  to  carry  110  guns  and  two 
vessels  that  were  able  to  mount  74  guns,  were  being  hurried  to 
comiiletion.  Moreover  insistent  demands  were  behig  made 
in  both  Houses  of  Parliament  for  a  more  vigorous  jxilicy,  and 
the  building  of  a  formidable  fleet  for  Canadian  waters.  Still 
the  folh-  and  waste  of  such  a  competition  were  ai)])arent,  aTul 
in  A])ril  .Adams  was  able  to  re])ort  Castlereagh  as  atlmitling, 
that  "to  keep  a  number  of  armed  Aessels  parading  about  iii)on 
"the  Lakes  in  times  of  i)eace  would  be  ridiculous  and  absurd. 


"There  could  he  no  motive  for  it,  aiul  everythinK  bexoml  what 
^^ should  be  necessary  to  yuard  against  smuggling,"  would  be 
"calculated  only  to  jmxluce  mischief." 

But  he  then  jiointed  out,  that  though  dis;irmament  was  so 
desirable   in   itself,    the   disiuivantages   attending   it    would   Ix- 
felt  only  by  t;reat   Britain.      If  war  broke  out   .suddenK .  and 
found  both  countries  without  a  naval  force  (jn  the  Lakes,  clearly 
the   I'liiteil  States  would   be  in   a   much   better  i)osition   than 
C.reat  Britain  to  extemporize  a  Heet.     In  those  da>s  of  wooiKn 
vessels,  the  building  materials  were  ready  at  hand  in  the  forests 
along   the   shores  of  the  Lakes,   and   Creat    Britain  from     the 
geographical  i)osition  would  be  hopelessly  handicapi)ed.     For 
her,  if  she  looked  for  war,  the  ])olic>-  of  a  perjictual  preparedness 
was  absolutely  essential.     Happily  Lord  C'asllereagh  took  the 
larger  view.     He  was  keenly  alive  to  the  waste  of  competitive 
armaments,  and  admitted  all  Mr.  Adams  had  to  urge  in  regard 
to  the  constant  occasion  of  jmnocation,  which  must  arise  on 
lK)lh  sides,  out  of  the  presence  of  armed  vessels  in  the  same  inland 
waters.     What  a  danger  to  international  pi^acc,  this  ])ro\imity 
of  naval   fleets  in   confined  waters,  nuist   have  jmAed   will   be 
apparent   if  we  consider  for  a  mcmient    the  case  of  the  C.reat 
Ocean  fleets  of  the  world.   Vou  will  remember  how,  in  the  days 
before   the  war,  the  naval    estimates  and   progrannnes  of   the 
great  Powers  were  always  the  object  of  jealous  scrutiiu  in  cNcrx 
countr>-.      No  exception  was  made  «'Ven   in   the  case Of  Creat 
Britain,  for  whom  a  su])reine  fleet  is  simi)h-  a  life  belt ;  w  ithoui   it 
she   sinks  at    once,  and   starves   before   she  goes   under.      Her 
fleet,  as  a  necessity  of  self  defence,   is  neither  a  thre.it    nor  a 
challenge  to  any,  and  her  shii)s  cruise  imi)artiall\-  from  .Arch- 
angel to  Hong  K<mg,  and  are  etiualiy  at   home  in  the  .Atlantic 
and   the   Pacific,    in   the    Re.l   Sea,    the   White  Sea,    the    Wallow 
Sea  or  at  the  gates  of  the  Black  Sea.     But  a  British  war  ve>sel 
on    tlie   C.reat    Lakes  could   have   onl\    one   p(,ssible  oi)])onent, 
and    the   p-esence   of   an    .American    >h\p  (,n    tlu>   -ame   waters 


8 


lu'ct's^arily  sujigeslcd  comijarisons,  and  im'\it<il)lc'  s])L'Culati<)ns 
as  to  the  rt'sult  of  a  trial  of  strcnj^th  with  her  rival.     In  these 
circumstances,  what  oi>]>()rtunities  there  would  he  for  rumours, 
and  exay;gerali(ms,  and  the  suspicions  horn  of  both,  whenever 
tliere  was  any  s]x-cial  activity  in  the  shi])yards  at  either  end 
of  the  Lakes,  hathiny;  the  frontiers  of  hotn  countries!    And  here 
rememt)er,  that  at  the  beginning  of  the  last  ceiitury,  each  lake 
was  a  seixirate  entity.    To-day,  there  is  an  uninterru]>ted  water- 
way from  Fort  William  to  the  Strait  of  Belisle.     Then,  Lake 
Su]icrior   was  cut  off  from  all  communication  with  Huron,  and 
the  canals  on  either  side  of  the  rapids  of  the  Sault  Ste.   Marie, 
which,  in  the  year  hefor  the  war,  carried  a  traffic  three  times  as 
great  as  that  of  the  Cireat  Waterway  at  Suez,  had  not  even 
been  thought  of.     In  the  same  way.  Lake  Ontario  was  cut  oft 
by  the  rapids  of  the  St.  Lawrence  and  the  Falls  of  Niagara, 
while  the  Falls  of  the  Ste.  Claire  River  eftectively  dosed  Lake 
Erie,  so  that  any  shij)  built  on    the  border  f)f  one  of  these  lakes 
had  to  be  maintained  there,  and  spend  the  rest  of  its  existence 
on  that  imrticular  lake.     Its  sole  function  anil  jnirpose  was  to 
counteract  the  inftuence  of  some  ri\al  \essel  on  the  other  side 
of  the  lake.      L(jrd  Casllereagh  could  not  forecast  the  future, 
but  he  was  a  good  judge  of  the  present,  anil  had  schooled  him- 
self to  the  thought   that  to  i)revent  war  was  better  than  jire- 
paration  for  it. 

Mr  Adams  wrote  to  the  impatient  Monroe  on  March  30, 
1816:— 

"You  may  consider  certain  that  the  proposal  to  dis- 

"arm  on  the  Lakes  will  not  be  accei)ted;" 

But  a  fortnight  later  the  principle  of  the  ])ro])()sal  had  been 
accepted.  Before  this  conclusion,  howe\tr,  was  arrived  at. 
Lord  ("astlereagh  took  the  op])ort unity  to  remind  Mr.  Adams, 
that  there  w(juld  have  been  no  need  for  the  j^resent  a])prehen- 
sions  if  only  the  recommendations  of  the  British  Commissioners 
at  (ihcnt  had  been  adopted.     Mr.  Adams  reported  as  follows: 


9 


"He  then  pointed  (JUt  that  C'.reat  Britain  had  proposed,  at  the 
"negotiations  at  Ghent,  that  the  whole  of  the  Lake^,  including 
"the  shores  should  belong  to  one  ])art\.  In  that  case  there 
"would  have  been  a  large  and  wide  natural  se])aration  l)etween 
"the  two  territories,  and  there  would  have  been  no  necessit>' 
"ior  armaments."  Surely  here  was  insight  and  vision!  If 
all  the  Great  Lakes,  and  their  coasts,  to  a  suitable  depth, 
including  the  sites  now  occupied  by  Chicagc;  and  Milwaukee. 
Detroit  and  Buffalo  had  been  assigned  to  Canada,  there  would 
have  been  no  (luestion  of  ri\al  naval  forces,  and  I  would  be 
depri\ed  of  the  pleasure  of  being  your  guest  today.  But  if 
Lord  Castlereagh  sighed  like  a  statesm.m  over  the  vanished 
scheme,  he  proposed  like  a  i)ractical  man  to  deal  with  the 
facts  as  he  found  them.  ()n  .August  13th,  1816,  the  new  British 
Minister  at  WashingKm,  Mr.' Charles  Bagot.  was  able  to  give 
the  assurance  that  "all  further  augmentation  of  the  British 
"naval  force  now  in  commission  on  the  Lakes  will  be  immediately 
"suspended."  In  August,  matters  were  carried  a  step  further 
when  Bagot  gave  Monroe  full  ])articulars  of  the  existing  Briti.sh 
fleet.  Considering  that,  in  those  da>s,  it  often  took  months 
to  get  a  reply  between  London  and  WashingKjn,  it  cannot  be 
said  that  the  negotiations  had  been  unduly  protracted.  But 
they  were  not  quick  enough  to  please  Mr.  Monroe.  And  here 
let  me  remark  that  in  the  past,  in  her  dealings  with  England, 
the  United  States  has  generalU-  had  this  advantage,  that  her 
troubles  have  come  to  her  singly  and  not  in  battalions.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  harassed  statesman  who  rejjresented  Great 
Britain  has  often  had  urgent  claims  on  his  attcnti(jn  from  maii\- 
parts  of  the  world  and  so  bceii  tempted  to  let  one  care  (lri\e  out 
another.  In  that  way  delays  and  silences  have  often  followed, 
which  have  given  occasion  for  sus])icions  of  rudeness  or  indiffer- 
ence. In  November.  1016.  Mr.  Mcmroc  in  a  letter  to  Adams 
notes  Lord  Castlereagh's  silence  and  then  goes  on  to  use  words 
which  show  that  he  was  beginning  to  distrust  the  good  faith  of 


10 


the  British  representative:  "The  limited  powers  that  were 
"given  to  Mr.  Bagot  had  much  ap]iearance  that  the  object  was 
"to  amuse  us  rather  than  to  adopt  any  effectual  measure.  The 
"supply  in  the  interim  of  Canada  with  a  vast  amount  of 
"cannon  and  munitions  is  a  circumstance  which  has  not 
"escaped  attention." 

But  there  was  no  ground  for  these  misgivings  and  an 
exchange  of  notes  ratifying  an  agreement  on  the  lines  originally 
suggested  by  Mr.  Monroe,  took  place  on  the  28th  and  29th  of 
April,  1817.  This  document  bore  the  signature  of  Charles 
Bagot,  British  Minister  at  Washington  and  Richard  Rush, 
who  was  now  Secretary  of  State. 

Of  the  two  men  whose  names  thus  acquired  an  immortality 
of  fame,  Mr.  Bagot  played  the  slighter  part,  owing  to  the  very 
limited  nature  of  the  powers  entrusted  to  him.  One  hopes  he 
enjoyed  his  stay  at  Washington;  but  as  the  first  representative 
of  Great  Britain  after  a  war  which  had  left  such  bitter  memories 
as  those  of  the  fratricidal  struggle  in  1812-14,  his  position  was  a 
difficult  one.  That  he  did  not  exix;ct  to  find  a  bed  of  roses  at 
Washington  may  perhaps  be  inferred,  from  the  following  passage 
in  a  letter  addressed  to  him,  just  after  his  ap]xjintment.  by 
Canning:  "  I  am  afraid  the  question  is  not  so  much  how  you 
"will  treat  them  (the  Americans)  as  how  they  will  treat  you, 
"and  that  the  hardest  lesson  which  a  British  Minister  has  to 
"learn  in  America  is  not  what  to  do.  but  what  to  bear.  But 
"even  this  may  come  round.  And  Waterloo  is  a  great  help  to 
"you.  perhaps  a  necessary  help  after  the  (to  say  the  least)  bal- 
"anced  successes  and  misfortunes  ot  the  .American  War."  How 
curious  all  this  reads  when  one  thinks  of  the  leave-taking  of 
Mr.  Bryce!  However.  Bagot  went  out  with  instructions  to  do 
whatever  was  possible  to  promote  the  restoration  cordial 
good  feeling  between  the  two  countries.  Of  Ric.  ,  Rush, 
who  was  Secretary  of  State  when  the  Agreement  was  signed, 
and  American  Minister  in  London  for  the  greater  part  of  the 


11 


year  which  elapsed  before  the  arrangement  was  finally  approved 
ofl.N-  the  Senate  and  proclaimed  by  the  President,  we  get  i)leasant 
glimpses  in  the  pages  of  that  very  entertaining  book  "Memor- 
anda of  a  residence  at  the  Court  of  London."     In  its  ojiening 
chapter   he   thus    describes   the  disixjsitions   in   which,   in   his 
opinion,  an  American  MiTiister  to  London  ought   to  approach 
his  task:  "No  language  can  express  the  emotion  which  almost 
"every   American   feels   when   he   first   touches   the   shores  of 
"Europe.    This  feeling  nmst  have  a  special  increase,  if  it  be  the 
"case  of  a  citizen  of  the  I'nited  States  going  to  England.     Her 
"fame  is  constantly  before  him;  he  hears  of  her  statesmen,  her 
"orators,  her  scholars,  her  philosophers,  her  divines,  her  ])alriots. 
"In   the  nurserj-  he  learns  her  ballads.     Her  iK)ets  train  his 
'imagination.     Her  language  is  his,  with  its  whole  intellectual 
"riches,  past  and  forever  newly  flowing— a  tie,  to  use  Burke's 
"  figure,  light  as  air  and  unseen,  but  stronger  than  links  of  iron. 
"In  spite  of  political  differences,  her  glory  allures  him;  in  spite 
"of  hostile  collision  he  clings  to  her  lineage.     'Three  thousand 
'"miles',  said  Franklin,  'are  as  three  thousand  years;  interven- 
"tion  of  space  seems  to  kindle  enthusiasm,  like  intervention 
'of  time.     Is  it  not  fit  that  two  such  nations  should  be  friends? 
"'Let  us  hope.'     It  is  the  hope  which  every  Minister  from  the 
■•  United  States  should  carry  with  him  to  England;  it  is  the 
•'hope  in  which  every   British  Minister  of  State  should  meet 
"him.     If,  nevertheless,   rivalry   is  in  the  nature  of  things,   at 
"least  let  it  be  on  fair  principles;  let  it  be  generous,  never  i);iltry, 
"never  malignant." 

Mr.  Rush  was  a  man  of  wide  culture  and  gifted  with  an 
historic  imagination.  When  the  vessel  that  was  taking  him  to 
England  was  ofT  the  Isle  of  Wight,  he  tells  how  he  reflected 
that  perhaps  they  were  ])assing  in  the  \ery  track  of  the  Armada, 
and  how  his  comrades  talked  of  the  "hero  Queen  of  Tilbury." 
When  the  Portsmouth  bells  were  set  ringi  ig  in  his  honour  On 
the  evening  of  his  arrival,  he  says:  "It  pa-  ,cd  in  our  thinights 


12 


"that  the  same  bells  mis^ht  huM-  rung  tlu-ir  peals  for  the  victories 
"of  Hawke  and  Nelson."     '  l\-rhai)s,'  said  one  of  the  party,  'for 
"Sir  Cloudsley  Shovel  too.'     His  rereption  in  !.on<lon  was  from 
the  first  all  that  he  ho])ed  f«  r,  and  he  was  soon  the  object  of 
hospitalities,  of  which  at  a  later  jioriod  he  wrote:  "they  can 
"neither  pass  from  the  memory  nor  groiv  cold  uiion  the  heart." 
But   though   Mr.  Rush  never  si)areil  himself  in  his  efforts  to 
bring  about  a  better  understaiuling  between  the  two  countries, 
he  proved  himself  a  sturdy  patriot,  an<l  succeeded  in  wresting 
from  (ireat  Britain  concessions  in  regard  to  the  cod  fisheries 
which  aftervvards  caused  great  resentment  in  the  Maritime  pro- 
vinces of  Canada.     Possibly,  however,  if  the  attempts  to  settle 
the  dispute  about  the  ()reg(m  boundar>-,  which  were  made  while 
Rush   was   in   L<mdon,   had   been   successful,   the   frontier  line 
between   our   two   countries   might    ha\e   been   j^laced   further 
south.     He  notes  the  hiquisitive  habi'.s  of  the  British,  which 
had  led  them  into  the  remotest  corners  of  the  earth,  and  with 
the  composure  of  an  historian  and  the  detachment  of  a  ])hiloso- 
l)her   muses   over   the   persistency   of   the   racial    type.     After 
recalling  that  in  the  days  of  Queen  Mary,  British  traders  had 
carried  their  wares  all  the  long  road  from  Archangel  to  Bagdad, 
he  goes  on  to  say:  "It  makes  a  ix.raliel  jjassage  in  their  history 
"to  see  them  at  the  present  day  pressing  for\vard  to  supply 
"with  rifles  and  blankets  savage  hordes  who  roam  through  the 
"woods  and  paddle  their  canoes  over  the  waters  of  the  farthest 
"and  wildest   portions  of  the   American   continent— on   shores 
"which   the  waters  of  the   Northern  Pacific  w-     i  in  solitude." 
But  it  was  a  British  statesman  who  would  hav-    ,Ivcn  away  the 
whole  of    British    Columbia   on    the   ground    that    a    country 
where  the  salmon  would  not  rise  to  a  fly  could  not  be  worth 
keeping. 

The  agreement  which  bears  the  names  of  Rush  and  Bagot 
w^as  at  least  a  model  of  brevity  and  simplicity.     Both  sitles 


lA 


kiu'w   wli.it  iluy  wanifd  and  tluy  wantt'd  the  saim-  tiiiii^       It 
was  a^nTd  that : 

The  iia\al  force  to  l)e  "maintained"  l>y  each  (i()\trninenl 
on  tlie  (ireat  Lakes  should  l)e  Hniited.  on  Lake  Ontario,  to  one 
vessel  not  exceeding  100  tons  l)urd("n  and  armed  with  one 
lX-i)oun(i  cannrm:  on  the  U])i)er  Uikes.  to  two  vessels  of  the  same 
Ifurden  and  armament;  and  on  Lake  ("hamplain,  to  one  similar 
vessel.  All  other  armed  vessels  on  the  Lakes  were  to  he  forth- 
with dismantled,  and  "no  other  vessels  of  war"  were  to  he 
"there  Iniilt  and  armed."  'I'his  stipulation  was  to  remain  Iti 
effect  till  six  months  after  either  ])art\  should  have  given  notice 
to  the  other  of  a  desire  to  terminate  it. 

The  British  authorities  at  once  dismantled,  or  hroke  u]), 
three  ships-of-the-line,  six  medium-sized  vessels  and  a  ninnher 
of  smaller  craft,  while  the  hlessed  work  of  destruction  was 
carried  on  in  the  American  harhours  «m  a  still  more  extensive 
scale. 

It  was  only  some  months  later  that  douht  arose  as  to  the 
validitv  of  the  Agreement,  as  to  whether  it  so  far  partook  of 
the  nature  of  a  foreign  treaty  as  to  recfuire  the  assent  of  the 
Inited  States  Senate.  It  was  thought  hetter  to  avoitl  all 
jiossihle  complications  on  this  score  hy  hringing  the  matter 
formalh-  hefore  the  Senate.  This  was  tlone  in  due  course  and, 
on  Ai)ril  16.  1818,  the  Senate  "ap])roved  and  consented,"  and 
a  few  days  later,  the  terms  of  the  agreement  were  formally 
])rocIaimed  hy  President  Monroe. 

To  this  day,  however,  "the  Rush-Bagoi  Agreement"  has 
never  heen  regarded  or  s])oken  of  as  a  formal  international 
treat}-.  It  was  an  Agreement  hy  an  exchange  of  notes  to  which 
each  side  gave  effect.  The  arrangement  worked  well  and  smoothly 
from  the  first,  and  its  conditions  have  heen  faithfully  kept, 
in  the  spirit,  if  not  always  in  the  letter,  hy  hoth  sides.  During 
the  years  1838-41  the  rehcllion  in  Canada  led  the  British 
Government  to  increase  somewhat  its  naval  force  on  the  Lakes. 


14 


American  remonstrances  were  met  by  the  explanation  to  the 
effect,  that  the  measures  taken  were  i)urely  defensive  and 
temiK)rary,  and  that  the  normal  state  v)f  thini;;,  would  be 
restore<l  at  ihe  earliest  iK)ssible  moment.  In  1857  the  British 
Ciovennnent  comi)lained  of  the  i)resence  of  the  "Michigan"  on 
the  l'i>per  Lakes  as  that  of  an  armed  vessel  of  much  K^'^iter 
toniiajje  than  the  aKreemenl  allowed.  That,  on  this  occasion, 
the  British  P'oreign  Office  was  not  over-hast>'  to  take  offence, 
may  i)erha]>s  be  inferred  from  the  fact  that  the  "Michigan" 
had  been  on  the  Upper  Lakes  for  thirteen  years  before  this 
objection  was  raised.  In  reply  the  United  States  (iovenimenl 
at  once  admitted  that  the  "Michigan"  was  many  times  too 
big,  but  urged  in  extenuation  that  it  was  armed  only  with  ihe 
sort  of  toy  gun  which  the  Agreer  jnt  sanctioned.  I  vmilerstand 
this  vessel  is  still  aHoat.-an  historic  relic.-as  the  "Wolverine". 
Nine  years  later,  g\aver  issues  were  involved.  Parties  of 
Confederaus.  using  Canada  as  their  base,  had  cai)tured  Federal 
steamers  on  lake  Erie,  and  had  raided  a  town  in  Vermont. 
Mr.  Seward,  the  American  Secretary  of  State,  ga^■e  notice  that 
"owing  to  recent  hostile  and  piratical  ])roceedings  on  the  lakes" 
it  would  be  necessary  to  increase  "the  observing  force"  main- 
tained there.  At  the  same  time,  following  the  precedent  set 
at  the  time  of  the  Canadian  rebellion,  he  explained  that  the 
stei)s  taken  wore  merely  defensi\e.  and  would  be  discontinued 
as  soon  as  the  d.mger  they  were  designed  to  meet  had  i)assetl 
away.  Mr.  Seward  further  and  rightly  insisted  that  "neither 
"party  meant  to  relinquish  the  right  of  self-defenc»'  in  the 
"event  of  civil  war."  At  the  same  time,  to  make  the  position 
of  his  Government  absolutely  correct,  and  to  secure  a  free  hand 
in  the  future,  he  ga\e  the  requisite  six  months'  notice  to  termin- 
ate the  Agreement.  This  was  acce])ied  by  (ireat  Britain  with 
the  expression  of  a  hojjc  that  the  old  arrangement  might  be 
restored  after  ])eace.  This  action  of  Secretary  Seward  was 
formalh"  api)roved  at  a  y>'m\   session  o*^  Congress  in  Fel)ruary, 


15 


1855.  Hut  at  'hat  liim-  the  triii  iijili  of  ilu-  NOrlluTii  Arniii-s 
was  in  si>{ht,  ami  hvUnv  the  -ix  montlis  had  tla])>f(l,  tlu-  tioticc 
tf)  t(.Tiniiiate  the  AKreeint'iit  was  wiihdrawii.  Ilic  liiiti'd 
States  (.oNtrmii  it  iiifornu-d  Hi>  Maji.-st\'s  ( .(.viTiiiiiciit  llial 
tlu-y  wire  willii  n  that  the  Auretinent  should  riniaiu  "practi- 
"tally"  in  fora-,  which  has  lu-en  construed  to  mean  that  tlie 
arranminent  must  l»e  renanled  as  still  in  existence. 

It  would  he  hard  to  overrate  the  l)Iessi:i}j;s  that  that  .\^rec- 
nient  has  been  t.)  both  countries.      It  has  been  the  ki\iiote  of 
their  policy  of  jH-'acc  for  a  hundred  \ears.  and  at  the  same  time 
has    hai>])ily    influenced    the    attitude    of    both  CoviriMuents 
towards    the   whole   (luestio.'    of   fortifications.     And    what    an 
object  lesson  has  been  here  for  the  rest  of  the  civili/ed  world. 
The   lon^a'st   frontier  on   the  earth's  surface   has  at    the  same 
time  been  the  most  defenceless — and  {]v  most  safe.      If  there 
had  been  the  sliRhtesl  disposition  to  bad  faith  on  either  si<le, 
the   Rush-Bagot  Agreement  would  have  broken  down  a  score 
of  times.      It  made  no  distinction  between  vessels  of  war  and 
ships  armed  for  the  revenue  ser\ice,  which  remained  outside  its 
restrict i(ms;    and  yet  neither  side  has  e\er  thought  of  taking 
•idvaiitagc  of  that  loo])-holc  of  evasion.      ilie  Agreement  just 
because  it  was  founded  in  good-will  has  outlived  all  the  condi- 
tions of  its  birth.     Sailing  vessels  ha\e  gi\en  wa>  to  steam,  and 
wood  to  iron,  and  lakes  that  were  then  isolateil  and  inde])endent 
havo  now  free  access  to  the  sea.  while  thiir  shores  which  were 
then  almost  tractless  solitudes  are  now   thick  with  great   and 
crowded  cities.      Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier,  sjicaking  in   the  Hou.-e  of 
Comnujns  at  Ottawa,  six  \ears  ago,  tised  these  memorable  words: 
'If  my  voice  could  be  heard  that  far,    I  would  ])resume  to  sa\- 
'to  our  American  friends;    there  may  be  a  spectacle,  perhaps, 
"nobler  than  that  ot  a  Inited  Continent — a  six.'ctacle  that  would 
"astound  the  world  by  its  ncnelty  and  grandeur— 'he  s])ectacle 
"of  two  peoples  living  in  amity  side  b>-  side  for  a  distance  of 
"four  thousand  miles  along  a  line  which  is  hardh    visible   in 


10 


"many  «iiiartirs,  willi  iu>  raiitiDH,  iiu  nuns  frowning  a«  ross  it, 
"with  no  fortrrsM's  on  fithir  sitlf,  with  no  arnianu-nt  ont' 
"a^;ainst  anollur,  l)Ut  li\  in^  in  liannony  ai\(l  inutnal  conruUnci'. 
"and  with  no  othrr  ri\alr>  than  gnuToiis  rnnilalion  in  the  arts 
"of  ]H'.a(t'.  I  .111-  Canadian  pcoj)!!-  I  would  >a>  that  if  it  is 
"]M»ssil)!'.'  for  lis  to  maintain  siicli  riiations  liftwci'ii  these  two 
"urowin^;  nations,  Canada  will  lia\e  rtndi-rcd  to  Old  KiiRland  a 
"sorviit  luuqii.illt'd  in  its  j)rismt  i-lftct  and  still  more  in  its 
" far-rearhing  cfmst'<jutnrfs." 

Siiri'ly  to-dav  we  inav  sav  thai  spUndid  dream  i-.  f.ir  on 
the  way  to  realization.  I'roin  the  Atlantic  to  the  I'acitie  the 
Canadian  frontier  line  stretrhes  for  three  thousand  eight  lu;t;- 
dred  and  forty  miles,  antl  its  strength  lies  not  in  armaments, 
Holy  Allianees.  or  Leagues  of  IVace.  hut  in  Canada's  trust  in  (lod 
and  in  ;he  honour  and  gr.od  faith  of  its  great  neighhonr.  A 
cynic  might  siiy  that  this  Icmg  line  remains  without  f(jrtitications 
on  either  side  because  much  of  it  is  ge(.,«'a])hically  inca]>al>le  of 
effective  military  defence.  Hut  that  would  l»e  a  very  su])erficial 
contention.  When  the  Old  WDrld  peo])Ies  ])lan  a  readjustment 
of  imeniational  houtuhiries  the  tir.-<t  thing  done  is  to  seek  out 
what  is  called  a  strategical  frontier.  In  the  New  World  the 
simi)licity  of  a  unit  of  latitude  has  sufticeil.  From  the  Lake  of 
the  Woods  to  the  Pacific  the  forty-ninth  i)arallel  is  good  enough 
for  us,  and  I  doiii)l  not,  if  circumstances  had  i)ermitted,  the 
P'(luator  itself  woukl  have  been  ])ressed  into  service  and  made 
to  serve  as  an  American  frontier  line;  and  why  this  difference 
between  the  Old  World  and  the  New?  The  only  answer  is 
that  strategic  frcmtiers  are  unnece^^.lr^  where  good  faith  and 
mutual  tnist  prevail. 

At  the  same  time,  and  at  this  monemt,  I  cann(^t  but  remem- 
ber that  there  is  another  people  that  put  its  whole  trust  in  a 
treaty  and  that  that  taist  was  betrayed,  when  Cfcrmany  struck 
her  foul  blow  and  violated  the  frontier  of  Belgium.  And  yet, 
on  the  other  hand,  note — and  it  is  virv  relevant  to  this  dis- 


i; 


(ii«M«m  (hat  C.riMt  Kriiaiti  was  i  tir^t  «.f  the  tu  utral  powirs 
to  entiT  llio  war.  and  that  ^hv  did  n.  for  tht-  sakr  of  thai  s.iinc 
irfat>.  If  Kiinland,  atul  tht-  for  Dominions,  of  Canada, 
Australia,  South  Afriia,  and  Ntw  /  .il.uul.  aiv  at  war  lo-da\. 
and  havf  stakfd  th»'ir  livis  on  the  issuo,  it  is  jjfiniarily  Ikh.ium' 
thfv  an-  inimh'd  to  \>i-  faith .'nl  to  It.  Ixiuni  aiui  tnir  i.  \\h- 
trial y  which  drtat  liritain  has  >i^n<c|. 

A  fritnd  who  htani  >  oniinw  '  ■  rt-  olisirvid  (\niiall>  : 

"So  many  vi'ssds    hav  lriv,nii      u^h   that  tnuur\ -oM 

a  a    '  liii  ^        ^hrtds  a.id  ])atih».-s. 

vur   -<  <MN»  I      -  ,ind   nearly   2,(l()(l 
nw<     umU  ,     he  Anifriiai\  li.i^  im 

'hai     iiar 


"a»;ri't'ni(nt  th.it    i     i> 
"Ships  (;f  war   agnrijj;a 
"naval  volunteers    (--in  ? 
the  (ircai  Lakes."      I 
(luvres  are    '>rgani/ed  u  hi 

to  visit  the  Lake  wat  Tir.t      ..n^ 
for  the  benefit  of  their        iy  frie 
He  live  in  a  world  of  rii;  »  and  ■ 
it.  wtiy  should  the  atn  emeti'    • 
oriier  of  things,  with      uli  adaj 
future  as  j)rudeiue  ma>    forer.t«(t 

Time  atid  o(c.i-~i       v\rll  \i> 
discussion  of  the    ')       ^iua*  y  ' 
exigencies  of  the  <-l       .,ed  o  'uh, 
the    prohibition     oi     constra«t«'  n 
r>rinci]>al  source  o*   trouliie,    ' 
the  shijjbuilding  establishni 
Lake  shores,  to  share  in  thi   co. 
Navy. 

Is  it  possible  to  s.ilisfy  thi  i^ll  wit  In  it  incurring  the  same 
dangers  as  were  foreseen,  and  intended  u  \<i-  guarded  against. 
by  the  treaty  made  in  1817?  The  situati^  n  in  the  two  countriis 
IS  not  al'ke,  for,  apart  from  aii\  (luesti.  of  greater  facilities 
for  building  modern  warshii)s  uhich  may  be  possessed  bv  the 


the  sunuiiir  nian- 

om*     y()Ui._.4  Americans 

!i(l    li-^  lay  ih.  -^rnattv  uniforms 

"(I--       As  I  h,  .  V     lrt'ad\     said. 

iiid  if  (X  <    >i()n  n  (luircs 

I         muilKd  ii»   tit    the   new 

i:       >    tin-   I'xigcticies  of    the 

Tumii    '  1  an>   but  the  briefest 

^unt-ment    to  meet    the 

!  ni'xlern  da\s.    I  supjiose 

f     \    -scls    of    war    is    till- 

'he  very  natural  desire  of 

■  h  ha\e  grown  u])  on  the 

'ii^i  of  the  1  nited  States 


18 

CniH'*!  Stall's,  the  ImiHrial  Navy  i^  ii(»i  « onstrtH  tid  on  this 
«<mliiift\l.  as  thf  Inilrd  Status  Navy  is.  Thr  (unstnu  lion  of 
warshi|)s  uilhoul  lin\ilation  would  larKily  iUi)rivf  iht-  iriat> 
of  any  value.  It  i^^.  howcvir.  dirticull  to  imagine  any  rcMrit  lions 
which  will  not  In-  ojh'U  to  the  siiine  obji-ction  on  ihe  jKirl  of 
those  who  may  he  j>revenleil  hy  them  from  ohiaininK  a  valuable 
c-ontrjicl,  Tlii^s.  it  must  be  remembcTed.  w  ii>i)ly  to  shii>s  to 
i)e  buill  for  foreign  K'»vemnients  as  well  as  for  the  Inited  States. 
The  (lilViculties  to  be  met  will  be  ^re-it.  and  I  eannol 
atteniiu  to  offer  any  satisfaetory  solution  of  them.  1  gladly, 
however,  welaime  the  oi)]iortunity  of  sunKeslinn  them  for  the 
e(msiderati(m  of  this  assembly  i.f  so  much  of  the  most  eniinenl 
legal  authority  in  your  eouutry .  If  my  remarks  should  be  the 
means  of  lurninj{  your  attention  to  the  subject  aiul  \.)ur  wistlont 
devise  provision  to  attain  an  object  of  such  iinjKirtance  to  the 
welfare  of  each  of  our  -oimtries,  I  shall  feel  that  1  have  not 
idly  occupied  your  time  and  tor  myself  shall  have  obtained  a 
great  reward. 


•  .^•rs^^X'^ 


«!=• 


"A-.  "-'911.  -''-•^j*«r-'-;. 


•  ''•''%  M-rT'^.  5r~^M?!  -rusrwrnssisammi 


